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INCOMPLETENESS FOR STABLY SOUND TURING MACHINES
YASHA SAVELYEV
Abstract. We first partly develop a mathematical notion of stable soundness intended to reflect the
actual soundness property of human beings. Then we show that given an abstract query machine
M the following cannot hold simultaneously: M is stably sound, M is computable, M can stably
decide the truth of any arithmetic statement. This can be understood as an extension of the Gödel
incompleteness theorem to stably sound setting. This is a non-trivial extension as stably sound
Turing machine can decide the halting problem. In practice such anM could be meant to represent a
weakly idealized human being so that the above gives an obstruction to computability of intelligence,
and this gives a formal extension of a famous disjunction of Gödel.
1. Introduction
The term machine 1 will just be a synonym for a partial map M : A→ B, with A,B sets with an
additional structure of an encoding in N. An encoding is just an injective map e : A → N with some
extra properties. This is described in more detail in Section 2.1.
Let A denote the set of (first order) sentences of arithmetic. And suppose we are given a machine
M : N→ A× {±},
for {±} a set with two elements +,−. If there is an n0 with M(n0) = (Σ,+) s.t. there is no m > n0
with M(m) = (Σ,−) then we say that Σ is M-stable.
Definition 1.1. We say that a machine
M : N→ A× {±}
is stably sound if for all Σ ∈ A:
Σ is M -stable =⇒ Σ is true.
We say that M decides arithmetic if
∀Σ ∈ A : Σ is true =⇒ Σ is M -stable.
So such an M has the following interpretation:
M(n) = (Σ,+)
if at the moment n M decides that Σ is true, while
M(m) = (Σ,−)
if at the moment m M does not decide that Σ is true. If Σ is M -stable we can also say M stably
decides Σ to be true. So that M is stably sound if and only if whenever M stably decides Σ to be
true, it is in fact true.
The following is one version of our main theorem, with Theorem 4.5 being a more fundamental
variant. We present this formulation first because a human mathematician intuitively works as a
machine M above.
Theorem 1.2. For M as above the following cannot hold simultaneously: M is stably sound, M
is computable and M decides arithmetic. Here ‘computable’ has the mostly standard meaning of
computability by a Turing machine, with specifics given in Section 2.1.
1For some authors and in some of the writing of Turing and Gödel “machine” is synonymous with Turing machine.
For us the term machine is just abstraction for a process acting on inputs, but it need not be a computational process,
in contrast to Turing machines.
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If we replace stably sound by sound then the above would just be a reformulation of Gödel’s
incompleteness theorem. Moreover, if we specialize our argument to this case then in the statement of
the theorem instead of M deciding arithmetic, we only need M to decide sentences (in Turing machine
language) of the kind: the Turing machine T does not halt on input n. In other words, we would
get the well known result of Turing that the halting problem is not soundly decidable by a Turing
machine. On the other hand there is a stably sound Turing machine which can stably soundly decide
the halting problem, cf. Example 3.3. So perhaps Turing machines stably soundly decide the truth of
any arithmetic statement? The above theorem shows that this is not the case.
1.1. Motivational background - intelligence, Gödel’s disjunction and Penrose. In what fol-
lows we understand human intelligence very much like Turing in [2], as a black box which receives
inputs and produces outputs. More specifically, this black box M is meant to be some system which
contains a human subject. We do not care about what is happening inside M . So we are not directly
concerned here with such intangible things as understanding, intuition, consciousness - the inner work-
ings of human intelligence that are supposed as special. The only thing that concerns us is what
output M produces given an input, not how it is produced. Given this very limited interpretation, the
question that we are interested in is this:
Question 1. Can human intelligence be completely modelled by a Turing machine?
An informal definition of a Turing machine (see [1]) is as follows: it is an abstract machine which
permits certain inputs, and produces outputs. The outputs are determined from the inputs by a
fixed finite algorithm, defined in a certain precise sense. For a non-expert reader we point out that
this “fixed” does not preclude the algorithm from “learning”, 2 it just means that how it “learns”
is completely determined by the initial algorithm. In particular anything that can be computed by
computers as we know them can be computed by a Turing machine. For our purposes the reader may
simply understand a Turing machine as a digital computer with unbounded memory running some
particular program. Unbounded memory is just a mathematical convenience. In specific arguments,
also of the kind we make, we can work with non-explicitly bounded memory. Turing himself has started
on a form of Question 1 in his “Computing machines and Intelligence” [2], where he also informally
outlined a possible obstruction to a yes answer coming from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem.
For the incompleteness theorem to have any relevance we need some assumption on the soundness
or consistency of human reasoning. Informally, a human is sound if whenever they asserts something
in absolute faith this something is indeed true. This requires context as truth in general is undefinable.
For our arguments later on the context will be in certain mathematical models. However, we cannot
honestly hope for soundness, as even mathematicians are not on the surface sound at all times, they
may assert mathematical untruths at various times, (but usually not in absolute faith). But we can
certainly hope for some kind of fundamental soundness.
In this work we will formally interpret fundamental soundness as stable soundness, which we already
partly described above. This notion of stable soundness is meant to reflect the basic understanding
of the way science progresses. Of course even stable soundness needs idealizations to make sense for
individual humans. The human brain deteriorates and eventually fails, so that either we idealize the
human brain to never deteriorate in particular never die, or M now refers not to an individual human
but to the evolving scientific community. We call such a human weakly idealized.
Around the same time as Turing, Gödel argued for a no answer to Question 1, see [11, 310], relating
the question to existence of absolutely unsolvable Diophantine problems, see also Feferman [6], and
Koellner [13], [14] for a discussion. Essentially, Gödel argues for a disjunction:
¬((S is computable) ∧ (S is sound) ∧A),
where S refers to a certain idealized subject, and where A says that S can decide any Diophantine
problem. Gödel’s argument can be formalized, see [14]. At the same time Gödel doubted that ¬A is
possible, again for an idealized S, as this puts absolute limits on what is humanly knowable even in
2In the sense of “machine learning”.
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arithmetic. Note that his own incompleteness theorem only puts relative limits on what is humanly
knowable, within a fixed formal system.
However, what is the meaning of ‘idealized’ above? If idealized just means stabilized in the sense
of this paper (Section 3 specifically) then there is a Turing machine T whose stabilization T s provably
decides the halting problem, cf. Example 3.3, and so T s is no longer computable. In that case, the above
disjunction becomes meaningless because passing to the idealization may introduce non-computability
where there was none before. So in this context one must be extremely detailed with what “idealized”
means physically. The process of the physical idealization must be such that non-computability is not
introduced in the ideal limit. In the case of weak idealization mentioned above it should certainly be
in principle possible but this not what is needed by Gödel. He needs an idealization that is plausibly
sound otherwise the disjunction would again be meaningless, while a weak idealization of a human is
only plausibly stably sound. Since we have no idea what is happening in the human brain, it is not at
all clear that what Gödel asks is even possible.
So the natural solution to attempt is to enrich the argument of Gödel so that it explicitly allows
for just stable soundness. But then we may worry: if stable soundness is such a loose concept that a
Turing machine machine can stably soundly decide the halting problem, maybe Turing machines can
stably soundly decide anything? So we need a new incompleteness theorem and this is the theorem
above.
After Gödel, Lucas [10] and later again and more robustly Penrose [16] argued for a no answer based
only on soundness and the Gödel incompleteness theorem, that is attempting to remove the necessity
to decide A or ¬A. A number of authors, particularly Koellner [13], [14], argue that there are likely
unresolvable meta-logical issues with the Penrose argument, even allowing for soundness. See also
Penrose [16], and Chalmers [4] for discussions of some issues. The issue, as I see it, is loosely speaking
the following. The kind of argument that Penrose proposes is a meta-algorithm P that takes as input
specification of a Turing machine or a formal system, and has as output a natural number (or a string,
sentence). Moreover, each step of this meta-algorithm is computably constructive. But the goal of the
meta-algorithm P is to prove P is not computable as a function! So on this rough surface level this
appears to be impossible. But it may be possible to modify the idea in some subtle way.
Notwithstanding, what we argue here is that there is much more compelling version of the original
Gödel disjunction that only needs stable soundness. The following is a slightly informal, applied version
of our Theorem 1.2.
Theorem 1.3. Either there are cognitively meaningful, absolutely non Turing computable processes in
the human brain, or human beings are stably unsound, or for any (could be weakly idealized) S there
exists a certain true arithmetic statement, let’s call it H(S) 3, that S will never stably decide to be
true. The above is indeed a mathematical fact 4, given our formalizations.
By absolutely we mean in any sufficiently accurate physical model. Note that even existence of
absolutely non Turing computable processes in nature is not known. For example, we expect beyond
reasonable doubt that solutions of fluid flow or N -body problems are generally non Turing computable
(over Z, if not over R cf. [3]) 5 as modeled in essentially classical mechanics. But in a more physically
accurate and fundamental model they may both become computable, possibly if the nature of the
universe is ultimately discreet. It would be good to compare this theorem with Deutch [5], where
computability of any suitably finite and discreet physical system is conjectured. Although this is not
immediately at odds with us, as the hypothesis of that conjecture may certainly not be satisfiable.
Remark 1.4. It should also be noted that for Penrose, in particular, non-computability of intelligence
would be evidence for new physics, and he has specific and very intriguing proposals with Hameroff [9]
on how this can take place in the human brain. As we have already indicated, new physics is not a
3H(S) is a statement in the language of Turing machines and so is number theoretic, however it is not a Diophantine
problem. Of course it cannot be by Example 3.3.
4Specifically a theorem of set theory, although we keep set theory implicit as usual.
5We are now involving real numbers but there is a standard way of talking of computability in this case, in terms of
computable real numbers. This is what means over Z.
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logical necessity for non-computability of brain processes, at least given the state of the art. However,
it is very plausible that new physical-mathematical ideas may be necessary to resolve the deep mystery
of human consciousness. Here is also a partial list of some partially related work on mathematical
models of brain activity, consciousness and or quantum collapse models: [12], [15], [7], [8].
As a final remark, technically the paper is mostly elementary and should be widely readable in
entirety.
2. Some preliminaries
This section can be just skimmed on a first reading. Really what we are interested in is not Turing
machines per se, but computations that can be simulated by Turing machine computations. These
can for example be computations that a mathematician performs with paper and pencil, and indeed
is the original motivation for Turing’s specific model. However to introduce Turing computations we
need Turing machines. Here is our version, which is a computationally equivalent, minor variation of
Turing’s original machine.
Definition 2.1. A Turing machine M consists of:
• Three infinite (1-dimensional) tapes Ti, To, Tc, (input, output and computation) divided into
discreet cells, next to each other. Each cell contains a symbol from some finite alphabet Γ with
at least two elements. A special symbol b ∈ Γ for blank, (the only symbol which may appear
infinitely many often).
• Three heads Hi,Ho,Hc (pointing devices), Hi can read each cell in Ti to which it points, Ho,Hc
can read/write each cell in To, Tc to which they point. The heads can then move left or right
on the tape.
• A set of internal states Q, among these is “start” state q0. And a non-empty set F ⊂ Q of
final states.
• Input string Σ: the collection of symbols on the tape Ti, so that to the left and right of Σ there
are only symbols b. We assume that in state q0 Hi points to the beginning of the input string,
and that the Tc, To have only b symbols.
• A finite set of instructions: I, that given the state q the machine is in currently, and given the
symbols the heads are pointing to, tells M to do the following. The actions taken, 1-3 below,
will be (jointly) called an executed instruction set or just step:
(1) Replace symbols with another symbol in the cells to which the heads Hc,Ho point (or leave
them).
(2) Move each head Hi,Hc,Ho left, right, or leave it in place, (independently).
(3) Change state q to another state or keep it.
• Output string Σout, the collection of symbols on the tape To, so that to the left and right of
Σout there are only symbols b, when the machine state is final. When the internal state is one
of the final states we ask that the instructions are to do nothing, so that these are frozen states.
Definition 2.2. A complete configuration of a Turing machine M or total state is the collection
of all current symbols on the tapes, position of the heads, and current internal state. Given a total
state s, δ(s) will denote the successor state of s, obtained by executing the instructions set of M on s,
or in other words δ(s) is one step forward from s.
So a Turing machine determines a special kind of function:
δM : C(M)→ C(M),
where C(M) is the set of possible total states of M .
Definition 2.3. A Turing computation, or computation sequence for M is a possibly not
eventually constant sequence
∗M(Σ) := {si}i=∞i=0
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of total states of M , determined by the input Σ and M , with s0 the initial configuration whose internal
state is q0, and where si+1 = δ(si). If elements of {si}i=∞i=0 are eventually in some final machine
state, so that the sequence is eventually constant, then we say that the computation halts. For a given
Turing computation ∗M(Σ), we will write
∗M(Σ)→ x,
if ∗M(Σ) halts and x is the corresponding output string.
We write M(Σ) for the output string of M , given the input string Σ, if the associated Turing
computation ∗M(Σ) halts. Denote by Strings the set of all finite strings of symbols in Γ, including
the empty string . Then a Turing machine M determines a partial function that is defined on all
Σ ∈ Strings s.t. ∗M(Σ) halts, by Σ 7→M(Σ).
In practice we will allow our Turing machine T to reject some elements of Strings as valid input.
We may formalize this by asking that there is a special final machine state qreject so that T (Σ) halts
with qreject for
Σ /∈ I ⊂ Strings,
where I is some set of all valid, that is T -permissible input strings. We do not ask that for Σ ∈ I
∗T (Σ) halts. If ∗T (Σ) does halt then we will say that Σ is T -acceptable.
Definition 2.4. We denote by T the set of all Turing machines with a distinguished final machine
state qreject.
It will be convenient to forget qreject and instead write
T : I → O,
where I ⊂ Strings is understood as the subset of all T -permissible strings, or just input set and O
is the set output strings or output set.
Definition 2.5. Given a partial function
f : I → O,
we say that a Turing machine in T ∈ T
T : I → O
computes f if T = f as partial functions on I.
2.1. Abstractly encoded sets. We will sometimes use abstract sets to refer to input and output
sets. However, these are understood to be subsets of Strings under some implicit, fixed encoding.
Concretely an encoding of A is an injective set map e : A → Strings. For example we may encode
Strings2 as a subset of Strings as follows. The encoding string of Σ = (Σ1,Σ2) ∈ Strings2 will be of
the type: “this string encodes an element Strings2: its components are Σ1 and Σ2.” In particular the
sets of integers N,Z, which we may use, will under some encoding correspond to subsets of Strings.
Indeed this abstracting of sets from their encoding in Strings is partly what computer languages do.
More formally, let S be an arrow category whose objects are maps eA : A → Strings, for eA an
embedding called encoding map of A, determined by A ∈ Set, and morphisms (m, m˜) commutative
diagrams:
A B
eA(A) ⊂ Strings eB(B) ⊂ Strings.
eA
m˜
eB
m
We may just write A ∈ S for an object, with eA implicit. We call such an A an abstractly encoded
set so that S is a category of abstractly encoded sets.
In addition we ask that S satisfies the following properties.
(1) For A ∈ S eA(A) is computable (recursive). Here, a set S ⊂ Strings is called computable if
both S and its complement are computably enumerable, with S called computably enumerable
if there is a Turing machine T so that ∗T (Σ) halts iff Σ ∈ S.
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(2) For A,B ∈ S AunionsqB is in S. Moreover, corresponding to the inclusion map i˜A : A→ AunionsqB we
have a morphism (iA, i˜A) in S:
A A unionsqB
eA(A) eAunionsqB(A unionsqB),
i˜A
iA
likewise with i˜B : B → A unionsqB. We ask that the map
eA(A) unionsq eB(B)→ eAunionsqB(A unionsqB)
induced by (iA, i˜A), (iB , i˜B) is bijective and iA(eA(A)), iB(eB(B)) are computable.
(3) If A,B ∈ S then A × B ∈ S and the projection maps p˜rA : A × B → A, p˜rB : A × B → B
complete to morphisms of S, similar to the above, so that we have a commutative diagram:
A×B A
eA×B(A×B) eA(A),
p˜rA
prA
and likewise with prB . Similarly the section maps
s˜b : A→ A×B s˜b(a) = (a, b),
complete to morphisms (s˜b, sb) in S, for all b. Likewise with the section maps
s˜a : B → A×B s˜a(b) = (a, b).
(4) There is an abstractly encoded set U = Strings ∈ S, with eU = idStrings. We can think of U
as the set of typeless strings.
(5) For A,B ∈ S,
(eA(A) ∩ eB(B) is non-empty) =⇒ (A = U) ∨ (B = U).
In particular each A ∈ S is determined by the image eA(A).
The specific such category S that we need will be clear from context later on. We only need to encode
finitely many types of specific sets. For example S should contain an abstract encoding of Z,N, {±},
T , with {±} a set with two elements +,−. The encodings of N,Z, T should be suitably natural so
that for example there is a computable total map S : e(N) → e(N) which corresponds under e to the
self-map n 7→ n+1 of N. This is not part of the axioms but we need this to construct specific abstract
Turing machines, whose definition follows.
For A,B ∈ S, given a partial set map f : A→ B we define
fe := eB ◦ f ◦ e−1A ,
called the encoding of f .
Definition 2.6. For A,B ∈ S an abstract Turing machine
T : Dom ⊂ A→ B
is a subset Dom ⊂ A for A ∈ S, a partial map
f : Dom→ B
and Te ∈ T ,
Te : eA(Dom)→ eB(B)
such that Te computes fe, with eA(Dom) the set of Te-permissible strings. The set Dom is called the
set of T -permissible strings. We often omit Dom from notation, especially when Dom = A. In
practice the partial map f will just be denoted by T itself.
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We define TS to be the set of abstract Turing machines relative to S as above. We will not need to
encode TS , as there is a natural embedding i : TS → T , i(T ) = Te and T is encoded, and this will be
sufficient for us.
For writing purposes we condense the above as follows.
Definition 2.7. A machine will be a synonym for a partial map M : Dom ⊂ A → B, with A,B
abstractly encoded sets. Dom may be omitted from notation. Note M is partial on Dom, not partial
on A with Dom the set where M is defined. So Dom ⊂ A is an extra specified structure. That said
we may omit to write Dom in particular when Dom = A.
M =MS will denote the set of machines. Given an abstract Turing machine T : A→ B, we have
an associated machine fog(T ) : A→ B defined by forgetting the additional structure Te. However we
may also just write T for this machine by abuse of notation. So we have a forgetful map
fog : T →M,
which forgets the extra structure of a Turing machine.
Definition 2.8. We say that an abstract Turing machine T computes M ∈M if fog(T ) =M . We
say that M is computable if some T computes M .
This has a number of expected properties, for example:
Lemma 2.9. If M : A→ B is computable and G : A→ C is computable then
D : A→ B × C, D(a) = (M(a), G(a))
is computable.
Proof. Clearly,
D(a) = s˜G(a)(M(a)),
for every a ∈ A, and for s˜c the section maps s˜c : B → B×C as in Axiom 3 for the category S and as a
result computable. Since M,G are also computable by assumption we may clearly construct a Turing
machine computing D, let us omit further detail. 
Composition. Given Turing machines
M1 : A→ B,M2 : C → D,
we may naturally compose them to get a Turing machine M2 ◦M1 : R → D, for R = M−11 (B ∩ C),
with the intersection taken in Strings. R can be empty in which case M2 ◦M1 is a Turing machine
which rejects all input. In the case of abstract Turing machines we ask that B = C and then the
composition operation is likewise readily defined. Let us not elaborate further.
2.2. Notation. Z always denotes the set of all integers and N non-negative integers. We will sometimes
specify an (abstract) Turing machine simply by specifying a map
T : I → O,
with the full data of the underlying Turing machine being implicitly specified, in a way that should be
clear from context.
3. On stable soundness
Definition 3.1. Given a machine:
M : N→ B × {±},
if there is an n0 with M(n0) = (Σ,+) s.t. there is no m > n0 with M(m) = (Σ,−) then Σ is called
M-stable and we say that M prints Σ stably.
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Definition 3.2. Given a machine
M : N→ B × {±},
we define
Ms : N→ U
to be the machine enumerating, in order, all the M -stable Σ. We call this the stabilization of M .
The range of Ms is called the stable output of M .
In general Ms may not be computable even if M is computable. Explicit examples of this sort can
be constructed by hand.
Example 3.3. We can construct a Turing machine
A : N→ P × {±},
whose stabilization As enumerates every Diophantine (integer coefficients) polynomial with no integer
roots, where P denotes the set of all Diophantine polynomials, (also abstractly encoded). Similarly,
we can construct a Turing machine D whose stabilization enumerates pairs (T, n) for T : N → N a
Turing machine and n ∈ N such that ∗T (n) does not halt. In other words D stably soundly decides
the halting problem. To do this we may proceed via a zig-zag algorithm.
In the case of Diophantine polynomials, here is a (inefficient) example. Let Z computably enumerate
every Diophantine polynomial, and let N computably enumerate the integers. In other words, in our
language, Z : N→ P, N : N→ Z are total bijective abstract Turing machines.
• Initialize an ordered list L by L = ∅, which we understand as a list of instructions.
• Start. For each p ∈ {Z(0), . . . , Z(n)} check if one of {N(0), . . . , N(n)} is a solution of p, if no
add (p,+) to L, if yes add (p,−). Call the resulting list Ln+1. Explicitly,
Ln+1 = L ∪
∑
p∈{Z(0),...,Z(n)}
(p, dn(p)),
where dn(p) = + if none of {N(0), . . . , N(n)} are roots of p, dn(p) = − otherwise,
where ∪ is set union operation of subsets of P ×{±}, with∑p∈{Z(0),...,Z(n)}(p, dn(p)) likewise
expanding to set union (p, dn(Z(0))) ∪ . . . ∪ (p, dn(Z(n)))
• Set L := Ln+1, an ordered list with order starting at 0.
• Set n := n+ 1 go to Start and continue.
This will define a function A : N → P × {±} whose value A(m) is the m’th, not necessarily final,
instruction in the list Lm+1. Clearly A is computable and it’s stabilization As enumerates Diophantine
polynomials which have no integer roots.
3.1. Decision machines. By a decision machine we mean a machine of the form:
D : Dom ⊂ B × N→ {±}.
Definition 3.4. For a decision machine D we say that a ∈ A is D-decided if there is an n0 ∈ N
with D(T, n0) = + s.t. there is no m > n0 with D(T,m) = −.
Given a machine M : N→ B × {±}, there is an associated decision machine:
DM : Dom ⊂ B × N→ {±},
with Dom defined to be the set of (b, n) ∈ B×N such that either prB ◦M(n) = b orM(n) is undefined,
for prB : B × {±} → B the projection. DM is defined on Dom by
DM (b, n) =

+ if M(n) = (b,+)
− if M(n) = (b,−)
undefined if M(n) is undefined.
Lemma 3.5. If M as above is computable then DM is computable. Moreover, b is M -stable iff b is
DM -decided.
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Proof. To keep notation simple let M denote the Turing machine computing the machine M . Let
M˜ : B × N→ (B × {±})×B
be the Turing machine defined (as a partial map) by M˜(b, n) = (M(n), b), using Lemma 2.9. Define
T to be the composition of (abstract) Turing machines:
T := R ◦ M˜,
for
R : (B × {±})× {±},
the Turing machine so that (b,±, a) is R-rejected, is not R-permitted, whenever b 6= a and otherwise
R(b,±, a) = pr±(b,±, a)
for
pr± : (B × {±})×B → ±
the projection. Then clearly T computes DM . The second part of the lemma is immediate.

In particular by the example above there is a Turing machine
DA : P × N→ {±}
that stably soundly decides if a Diophantine polynomial has integer roots, meaning:
p is DA-decided ⇐⇒ p has no integer roots.
We can of course also construct such a DA more directly. Likewise there is a Turing decision machine
that stably soundly decides the halting problem.
Definition 3.6. Given a machine
M : Dom ⊂ N×B → {±}
and a Turing machine
T : Dom ⊂ N×B → {±},
we say that T stably computes M , or that ΘsM,T holds, if
b is M -decided ⇐⇒ b is T -decided.
4. Incompleteness for stably sound Turing machines
Let D denote the set of abstract machines of the form:
D : Dom ⊂ T × N→ {±},
with subset Dom not fixed. And set
Dt := {T ∈ TS |fog(T ) ∈ D}.
In what follows, for T ∈ T when we write T ∈ Dt we mean that T ∈ image i|Dt , for i : TS → T the
embedding discussed in Section 2.1. Likewise, if T ∈ image i|Dt then by T (T,m) we mean i−1(T )(T,m),
so that in what follows the sentence “T is not T -decided” makes sense for such a T . Explicitly, for
T ∈ image i|Dt , T is not T -decided, will mean that for every n with i−1(T )(T, n) = + there exists an
m > n such that i−1(T )(T,m) = −.
Definition 4.1. For a D ∈ D, we say that D is stably sound on T ∈ T if
(T is D-decided) =⇒ (T ∈ Dt) ∧ (T is not T -decided).
We say that D is stably sound if it is stably sound on all T . We say that D stably decides P(T )
if whenever the statement:
(T ∈ Dt) ∧ (T is not T -decided)
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is true, T is D-decided. We say that D stably soundly decides P(T ) if D is stably sound on T and
stably decides P(T ). We say that D stably soundly decides P if D stably soundly decides P(T )
for all T ∈ T .
The interpretation of the above is that each D ∈ D is understood as a machine with the properties:
• For each T, n D(T, n) = + if D decides at the moment n that T ∈ Dt and T is not T -decided .
• For each T, n D(T, n) = − if D does not decide/assert at the moment n that T ∈ Dt, or D
does not decide that T is not T -decided.
Lemma 4.2. If D is stably sound on T ∈ D then
¬ΘsD,T ∨ ¬(T is D-decided).
Proof. If
T is D-decided
then since D is stably sound, T is not T -decided, so of course ¬ΘsD,T . 
Theorem 4.3. There is no (stably) computable D ∈ D that stably soundly decides P.
Proof. Suppose otherwise that there is such a D, then by the above lemma we obtain:
∀T ∈ T ± : ¬ΘsD,T ,
but this is absurd since by assumption D is (stably) computable. 
Definition 4.4. For D ∈ Dt, we say that R(D) holds if for any T ∈ Dt such T is not T -decided:
∃T ′ ∈ Dt : (D stably decides P(T ′)) ∧ (T 's T ′).
Theorem 4.5. For D ∈ D the following cannot hold simultaneously: D is stably sound, D is (stably)
computable and RD holds.
Proof. Suppose that D is stably computed by some T ∈ Dt. If D is stably sound then by Lemma 4.2
¬(T is D-decided),
and so
¬(T is T -decided),
since T stably computes D. Consequently, if R(D) then for some T ′ ∈ Dt stably computing T , T ′ is
D-decided. And so by Lemma 4.2 ¬ΘsD,T ′ , which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Suppose otherwise that we have such an M , so M is stably sound, computable
and such that
∀Σ ∈ A : Σ is true ⇐⇒ Σ is M -stable.
It is well known that sentences in the language of Turing machines are logically equivalent to
sentences in arithmetic. This means that given a sentence Σt in the language of Turing machines, e.g.
“T halts on input n” there is a sentence Σ ∈ A so that Σt is true iff Σ is true. Indeed this kind of
translation already appears in the original work of Turing [1].
Let s(T ) ∈ A be the sentence logically equivalent to
(T ∈ Dt) ∧ (T is not T -decided).
Define a machine D˜M ∈ D by
D˜M (T, n) := DM (s(T ), n)
for DM defined as in Section 3. Then by Lemma 3.5 and by supposition above DM ∈ D is stably
sound, computable, and DM stably decides P. But this contradicts Theorem 4.3. 
INCOMPLETENESS FOR STABLY SOUND TURING MACHINES 11
5. Application: A human as a decision machine
Let S be a human subject in a controlled environment, in communication with an experimenter/op-
erator E that as input passes to S elements of I = T ×N. Here controlled environment means primarily
that no information that is not explicitly controlled by E and that is usable by S passes to S while
they are in this environment. This condition is only for simplicity, so long as we know in principle
what “input” our S receives it doesn’t matter what kind of environment they are in. For practical
purposes S has in their environment a general purpose digital computer with arbitrarily, as necessary,
expendable memory, (in other words a universal Turing machine).
We suppose that upon receiving any I ∈ I, (for example as data in their computer) after possibly
using their computer in some way, S instructs their computer to print after some indeterminate time
an element
O ∈ {±}.
So S is meant to determine a decision machine:
(5.1) DS : T × N→ {±},
interpreted as in the previous section.
Remark 5.2. The above is partially a simplification, because for a real world S it may be that each
DS(I) must be understood as a probability distribution on {±}. In other words the value DS(I) may
only be determined up to some dice roll, which we may expect if quantum mechanics plays a significant
role in the human brain. This extra complexity will be ignored, as it does not meaningfully change any
of our arguments since dice rolls can be simulated completely with Turing machines. Moreover, we
are only interested in the stable behaviour of DS, i.e. the set of DS-decided elements of T . And this
stable behavior, given our interpretation of DS as a decision machine, should not be affected by any
dice rolls.
In what follows when we say “S perceives” we mean that some (implied) machine associated to our
physical S stably decides, where this has the same meaning as previously.
If DS is stably sound and computable then by Theorem 4.5 ¬R(DS). And this in particular means
that there exists a TS ∈ Dt so that the statement
(TS ∈ Dt) ∧ (TS is not TS-decided)
is true but S will never perceive it to be true. On the other hand R(DS) is of course implied by S
being able to perceive, for any given Turing machine
f : N→ {±},
that no n is f -decided if this is in fact true. However, the condition R(DS) is likely weaker since for
TS as above TS(TS , ·) stably computes the partial function
u : {∅} ⊂ N→ {±},
in other words u is defined nowhere. One can then hope, since u is so simple, that TS can be put into
a normal form T ′ with TS 's T ′ and with T ′(T ′, ·) = u and so that S can perceive that T ′(T ′, ·) = u.
In any case, if we define H(S) := s(TS), with the latter defined as in the proof of Theorem 1.2, then
we obtain our Theorem 1.3.
5.1. Relationship with the Gödel and Penrose argument. The most lucid analysis, known to
me, of the Gödel and Penrose arguments for obstructions to computability of intelligence appears in
Koellner [13], [14]. Our argument for Theorem 1.3 extends Gödel’s idea [11, 310], although I am
also inspired by the ideas of Penrose. One note is that our argument is entirely based on set theory,
while Gödel’s argument has meta-logical elements that require interpretation. Although, as Koellner
explains [14], Gödel’s argument can also be at least in some sense fully formalized.
This is not to say that there are no issues of interpretation in Theorem 1.3. One must interpret our
definition of stable soundness as it applies to actual human beings. We of course have already partly
addressed this. Scientists operate on the unshakeable faith that scientific progress converges on truth.
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And our interpretation above of this convergence as stable soundness is very simple and natural, at
least under the previously explained assumption of weak idealization.
It is of course always the case that we must interpret mathematical theorems when applied to the
real world. What one looks for is whether there is any meaningful physical obstruction to carrying out
the necessary idealization in principle. In our specific case I see no such obstruction. Of course if the
universe and humanity must eventually go extinct then our weakly idealized humans cannot even in
principle exist. But to me this is not a meaningful obstruction. The potential mortality of the universe
is very unlikely to have any causal relation with computability of intelligence. So we can imagine an
eternal universe and a weakly idealized human, run the argument then translate to our universe.
So the only thing to reasonably wonder is whether for every S there must be such a stably unde-
cidable arithmetic statement of the form H(S) above.
Acknowledgements. Dennis Sullivan, Bernardo Ameneyro Rodriguez, David Chalmers, and in par-
ticular Peter Koellner for helpful discussions on related topics.
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